## Statistics for Particle Physics

1. Claim of discoveris based on sigma's

Giulio D'Agostini

giulio.dagostini@roma1.infn.it
http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/

Università La Sapienza e INFN, Roma, Italy



# Preamble

## (First slides from AT seminars at CERN)



If I insist on probability, rather than speaking, very generally, about statistics, it is because I have good reasons.

As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. (Einstein)

## Statistics lectures?

"If we were not ignorant there would be no probability, there could only be certainty.



## Statistics lectures?

"If we were not ignorant there would be no probability, there could only be certainty. But our ignorance cannot be absolute, for then there would be no longer any probability at all. "If we were not ignorant there would be no probability, there could only be certainty. But our ignorance cannot be absolute, for then there would be no longer any probability at all. Thus the problems of probability may be classed according to the greater or less depth of our ignorance." (Poincaré)

## Statistics lectures?

## "It is scientific only to say what is more likely and what is less likely" (Feynman)



Title of the lectures ("Telling the truth with statistics")

 $\blacktriangleright$  proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted. . .

- proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted...
- I interpret it as a direct question, to which I will try to give my best answer

- proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted...
- I interpret it as a direct question, to which I will try to give my best answer, quite frankly.
- How to interpret the question?
  - 1. "Tell the Truth"?
    - What is <u>the true</u> value of a quantity?
    - What is <u>the true</u> theory that describes the world?
  - 2. "Tell the truth"  $\iff$  "to lie"?

- proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted...
- I interpret it as a direct question, to which I will try to give my best answer, quite frankly.
- How to interpret the question?
  - 1. <u>"Tell the Truth</u>"?  $\Rightarrow$  Question to God
    - What is the true value of a quantity?
    - What is the true theory that describes the world?
  - 2. "Tell the truth"  $\iff$  "to lie"?


- proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted...
- I interpret it as a direct question, to which I will try to give my best answer, quite frankly.
- How to interpret the question?
  - 1. <u>"Tell the Truth</u>"?  $\Rightarrow$  Question to God
    - What is the true value of a quantity?
    - What is the true theory that describes the world?
  - 2. "Tell the truth"  $\iff$  "to lie"?  $\Rightarrow$  Not fair


Title of the lectures ("Telling the truth with statistics")

- proposed by organizers  $\rightarrow$  accepted...
- I interpret it as a direct question, to which I will try to give my best answer, quite frankly.
- How to interpret the question?
  - 1. <u>"Tell the Truth</u>"?  $\Rightarrow$  Question to God
    - What is <u>the true</u> value of a quantity?
    - What is the true theory that describes the world?
  - 2. "Tell the truth"  $\iff$  "to lie"?  $\Rightarrow$  Not fair, though

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics" (Benjamin Disraeli/Mark Twain)


## Damned lies and statistics






## Damned lies and statistics

Well known subject, especially in marketing and politics





## **BloombergView**

f

V

in

8+

HOME

. . .

EDITORIAL BOARD

COLUMNISTS

TOPICS

SCIENCE

## Lies, Damned Lies and Physics

16 OEC 30, 2015 9:30 AM EST

#### By Faye Flam

To most of us, 93-to-1 odds would make for a clear-cut bet. To physicists? Not so much.

On Dec. 15, the New York Times reported that Santa may have brought physics a new subatomic particle, a hitherto unknown entity materializing in the giant collider at CERN, near Geneva. It wasn't a sure thing, but according to the Times, the odds are in the scientists' favor, with only a 1-in-93 chance that the data pointing to the particle represent a statistical fluke.

#### SCIENCE

. . .

# Physicists in Europe Find Tantalizing Hints of a Mysterious New Particle

#### By DENNIS OVERBYE DEC. 15, 2015

$\geq$	Email
f	Share
y	Tweet
	Save
*	More

Does the <u>Higgs boson</u> have a cousin?

Two teams of physicists working independently at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, reported on Tuesday that they had seen traces of what could be a new fundamental particle of nature.

CONSIDERATION

One possibility, out of a gaggle of



Researchers at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN are smashing together protons to search for new particles and forces. Fabrice Coffini/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

## New York Times, 15 December 2015

"I don't think there is anyone around who thinks this is conclusive," said Kyle Cranmer, a physicist from New York University who works on one of the CERN teams, known as Atlas. "But it would be huge if true," he said, noting that many theorists had put their other work aside to study the new result.

When all the statistical effects are taken into consideration, Dr. Cranmer said, the bump in the Atlas data had about a 1-in-93 chance of being a fluke — far stronger than the 1-in-3.5-million odds of mere chance, known as five-sigma, considered the gold standard for a discovery. That might not be enough to bother presenting in a talk except for the fact that the competing CERN team, named C.M.S., found a bump in the same place.

## Le Scienze, 19 dicembre 2015



Tracce di ener Come risolvere il mi dell'espansione acc In edicola dal 4 ge


**ABBONAMENTI E RINN** 

🕈 🛛 ZOOM SU 💿 optogenetica 💿 epidemiologia 💿 longevità 💿 Internet 💿 visione 🖉

Vodafone Super Fibra Family Parli e navighi senza limiti da 30€/mese per 12 mesi Attivazione gratuita!

#### 19 dicembre 2015

## Qualcosa di nuovo da LHC? Solo il tempo lo dirà



(Cortesia Maximilien Brice/CERN)

Nuovi dati degli esperimenti ATLAS e CMS del Large Hadron Collider del CERN di Ginevra hanno mostrato un eccesso nella produzione di coppie di fotoni, localizzato a una massa particolare. Ma è ancora troppo presto per dire se sia un primo segno di una nuova era per la fisica delle particelle oppure solo una fluttuazione del rumore di fondo *di Marco Delmastro* 

CONTENUES CODES AN

Nel caso dell'eccesso sullo spettro delle coppie di fotoni, se uno prende il grafico di ATLAS in cui la montagnola è più prominente, la probabilità che questa sia dovuta a una casualità è due su 10.000, dunque piuttosto piccola. Quando però consideriamo il fatto di aver cercato montagnole un po' dappertutto, allora questa probabilità aumenta a due su 100. I numeri di CMS sono persino più grandi, indicando una probabilità ancora più grande che si tratti solo di una fluttuazione del rumore di fondo.

## Le Scienze, 19 dicembre 2015

Nel caso dell'eccesso sullo spettro delle coppie di fotoni, se uno prende il grafico di ATLAS in cui la montagnola è più prominente, la probabilità che questa sia dovuta a una casualità è due su 10.000, dunque piuttosto piccola. Quando però consideriamo il fatto di aver cercato montagnole un po' dappertutto, allora questa probabilità aumenta a due su 100. I numeri di CMS sono persino più grandi, indicando una probabilità ancora più grande che si tratti solo di una fluttuazione del rumore di fondo.

"In the case of the excess in the two-photon spectrum, if one takes the ATLAS plot, where the bump is more prominent, the probability that this is due to randomness is 2 in 10,000, then rather small. When instead we consider the fact that we have been looking bumps everywhere, this probability increases to 2 in 100. CMS numbers are even larger, indicating an even larger probability that it is just a fluctuation of the background."

**Amico:** Nell'articolo è scritto: "… la probabilità che questa sia dovuta a una casualità è due su 10.000, dunque piuttosto piccola. Quando però consideriamo il fatto di aver cercato montagnole un po' dappertutto, allora questa probabilità aumenta a due su 100."

Se capisco bene, lei stima a (1 - 0.02) = 0.98 la probabilità che NON si tratti di una fluttuazione casuale nell'ipotesi peggiore.

Cioè ne siamo praticamente certi?

**Friend:** In the article there is written "... the probability that is due to randomness is two in 10000, hence rather low. When however we take into account the fact that we have been searching for bumps everywhere, this probability rises to two in 100."

If I understand well, you estimate in (1 - 0.02) = 0.98 the probability that is NOT a random fluctuation, in the worst hypothesis.

Does it mean we are almost certain of it?

Autore: Ciao,

Due commenti:

1) non puoi trasformare la probabilità dell'ipotesi nulla in quella dell'ipotesi di scoperta così. Che ci sia il 2% di probabilità che l'eccesso sia dovuto alla fluttuazione del fondo non vuol dire che c'è il 98% di probabilità che l'eccesso sia generato da un segnale genuino. I p-valori sono complicati ;-)

2) il 2% che si tratti di una fluttuazione non è una probabilità piccola!

Author: Ciao,

Two comments:

1) you cannot transform so the probability of the null hypothesis in that of the hypothesis of discovery. The fact that there is 2% probability that the excess is due to a fluctuation of the background does not mean that there is 98% probability that the excess is generated by a genuine signal. P-values are complicate ;-)

2) 2% of being a fluctuation is not a small probability!

**Amico:** Perdonami, non è questione di p-value, [...] Ma del senso letterale di quello che scrivi:

Se A è l'affermazione "questa sia dovuta a una casualità", tu dici che  $P(\mathsf{A})=2\%$ 

Ergo P(non-A) = 98% perché P(A) + P(non-A) = 1 sta negli assiomi della probabilità. O no?

**Friend:** Excuse me, it isn't a matter of p-values, [...] but of the literal meaning of what you wrote:

If A is the statement "this is due to randomness", you state that  $P(\mathsf{A})=2\%$ 

Therefore P(non-A) = 98% because P(A) + P(non-A) = 1 is in the axioms of probability. Or not?

### Autore: Ciao,

No, purtroppo si tratta proprio di p-value, e del confronto tra probabilità condizionali e non condizionali tra due ipotesi. Tutto questo nell'articolo per le Scienze ovviamente non c'è, e li ho dovuto "tradurre" per il pubblico non-tecnico in termini (approssimati) di probabilità tradizionale una trattazione in realtà più complessa. Se però ti interessa fare una discussione formale, allora mi spiace ma non è quell'articolo a cui devi fare referenza, ma questo:

https://cds.cern.ch/record/2114853 (vedi per esempio la sezione 8 e le sue referenze).

Buona lettura, M.

## Author: Ciao,

No, unfortunatly it is indeed about p-values, and the comparison between conditional and non conditional probabilities of two hypotheses. All this in the Le Scienze article is obviously missing, and I had to "translate" a treatment in reality much more complex for the general public in (approximated) terms of traditional probability . If however your interested in a formal discussion, then I am sorry but it is not that article that you have to take as reference, but this one:

https://cds.cern.ch/record/2114853 (see for example section 8 and references therein).

Have a nice reading, M.

(Gibberish for Italians... [wiki/Supercazzola#Origine ])

**Mascetti:** Tarapia tapiòco! Prematurata la supercazzola, o scherziamo?

Vigile: Prego?

Mascetti: No, mi permetta. No, io... scusi, noi siamo in quattro. Come se fosse antani anche per lei soltanto in due, oppure in quattro anche scribai con cofandina? Come antifurto, per esempio. **Vigile**: Ma che antifurto, mi faccia il piacere! Questi signori qui stavano sonando loro. 'Un s'intrometta! Mascetti: No, aspetti, mi porga l'indice; ecco lo alzi così...guardi, guardi, guardi. Lo vede il dito? Lo vede che stuzzica? Che prematura anche? [...] Vigile: [...] mi seguano al commissariato, prego! **Perozzi:** No, no, no, attenzione! Noo! Pastene soppaltate secondo l'articolo 12, abbia pazienza, sennò posterdati, per due, anche un pochino antani in prefettura... Mascetti: ... senza contare che la supercazzola prematurata ha perso i contatti col tarapia tapioco. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoEK22 © GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 12/78

How much likely?

# Remember

# *"It is scientific only to say what is more likely and what is less likely"*

(Feynman)

C GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] – 13/78

# Statistics Vs Probability $\ \rightarrow$



## Defining the issue

What do we mean by "statistics"?

## Defining the issue

What do we mean by "statistics"?

Usually several things:

- descriptive statistics [e.g. Webster's (Kdict)]
  - "The science which has to do with the collection and classification of certain facts respecting the condition of the people in a state."
  - "(pl.) Classified facts respecting the condition of the people in a state, their health, their longevity, ... especially, those facts which can be stated in numbers, or in tables of numbers, or in any tabular and classified arrangement."

 $\Rightarrow$  <u>extended to scientific data</u>.

What do we mean by "statistics"?

Usually several things:

- descriptive statistics [e.g. Webster's (Kdict)]
  - "The science which has to do with the collection and classification of certain facts respecting the condition of the people in a state."
  - "(pl.) Classified facts respecting the condition of the people in a state, their health, their longevity, ... especially, those facts which can be stated in numbers, or in tables of numbers, or in any tabular and classified arrangement."

 $\Rightarrow$  <u>extended to scientific data</u>.

- Probability theory
- Inference

What do we mean by "statistics"?

Usually several things:

- descriptive statistics [e.g. Webster's (Kdict)]
  - "The science which has to do with the collection and classification of certain facts respecting the condition of the people in a state."
  - "(pl.) Classified facts respecting the condition of the people in a state, their health, their longevity, ... especially, those facts which can be stated in numbers, or in tables of numbers, or in any tabular and classified arrangement."

 $\Rightarrow$  <u>extended to scientific data</u>.

- Probability theory
- ► Inference ⇒ primary interest to physicists

What do we mean by "statistics"?

... and all together:

"A branch of applied mathematics concerned with the collection and interpretation of quantitative data and the use of probability theory to estimate population parameters" [WordNet (Kdict)]

What do we mean by "statistics"?

... and all together:

"A branch of applied mathematics concerned with the collection and interpretation of quantitative data and the use of probability theory to estimate population parameters" [WordNet (Kdict)]

 $\Rightarrow$  inferential aspect enhanced

What do we mean by "statistics"?

... and all together:

"A branch of applied mathematics concerned with the collection and interpretation of quantitative data and the use of probability theory to "estimate population parameters [WordNet (Kdict)]

 $\Rightarrow$  inferential aspect enhanced

Though we physicists are usually not interested in population parameters, but rather on physics quantities, theories, and so on.

What do we mean by "statistics"?

... and all together:

"A branch of applied mathematics concerned with the collection and interpretation of quantitative data and the use of probability theory to "estimate population parameters [WordNet (Kdict)]

 $\Rightarrow$  inferential aspect enhanced

Though we physicists are usually not interested in population parameters, but rather on physics quantities, theories, and so on.

Inference: learning about theoretical objects from experimental observations (see later)

Descriptive statistics Little to comment, apart that the process of summarizing 'a State' in a few numbers, in a diagram or in a table causes an enormous loss of detailed information, and this might lead to misunderstandings or even 'lies'.

 $\Rightarrow$  the famous 'half chicken' joke.<sup>†</sup>

### Where are the problems?

Descriptive statistics Little to comment, apart that the process of summarizing 'a State' in a few numbers, in a diagram or in a table causes an enormous loss of detailed information, and this might lead to misunderstandings or even 'lies'.

 $\Rightarrow$  the famous 'half chicken' joke.<sup>†</sup>

Probability theory Essentially OK, if we only consider the mathematical apparatus.

### Where are the problems?

Descriptive statistics Little to comment, apart that the process of summarizing 'a State' in a few numbers, in a diagram or in a table causes an enormous loss of detailed information, and this might lead to misunderstandings or even 'lies'.

 $\Rightarrow$  the famous 'half chicken' joke.<sup>†</sup>

Probability theory Essentially OK, if we only consider the mathematical apparatus.

Inference Messy:

- Traditionally, a collection of *ad hoc* prescriptions
   ... accepted more by authority than by full awareness of what they mean
- $\Rightarrow$  The physicist is confused<sup>†</sup> between good sense and statistics education

### Where are the problems?

Descriptive statistics Little to comment, apart that the process of summarizing 'a State' in a few numbers, in a diagram or in a table causes an enormous loss of detailed information, and this might lead to misunderstandings or even 'lies'.

 $\Rightarrow$  the famous 'half chicken' joke.<sup>†</sup>

Probability theory Essentially OK, if we only consider the mathematical apparatus.

**≻Inference** Do better?

 Much improvement is gained if inference is grounded on probability theory Where are the problems?
Descriptive statistics Little to comment, apart that the process of
 summarizing 'a State' in a few numbers, in a diagram
 or in a table causes an enormous loss of detailed
 information, and this might lead to
 misunderstandings or even 'lies'.
 ⇒ the famous 'half chicken' joke.<sup>†</sup>
Probability theory Essentially OK, if we only consider the
 mathematical apparatus.
Inference Do better?

- Much improvement is gained if inference is grounded on probability theory
- Summaries of descriptive statistics can be used in those cases in which statistical sufficiency holds

(e.g. when we use the sample arithmetic average and standard deviation, instead of the n data points)

### $\mathsf{Statistics} \leftrightarrow \mathsf{probability}$

The fact that statistical results are often "misinterpreted" is rather well known.



### $\mathsf{Statistics} \leftrightarrow \mathsf{probability}$

The fact that statistical results are often "misinterpreted" is rather well known.

But not because the general public is made of idiots!

### Statistics $\leftrightarrow$ probability

The fact that statistical results are often "misinterpreted" is rather well known.

But not because the general public is made of idiots!

It is just because the 'conventional' statistical school misuses words and convey wrong messages (also among expert practitioners, as most physicists).

### Statistics $\leftrightarrow$ probability

The fact that statistical results are often "misinterpreted" is rather well known.

But not because the general public is made of idiots!

It is just because the 'conventional' statistical school misuses words and convey wrong messages (also among expert practitioners, as most physicists). 2011: non only Opera...

 April, CDF: absolutely unexpected excess at about 150 GeV

#### pprox 3.2 $\sigma$

September, Opera: neutrinos faster than light

#### pprox 6 $\sigma$

December, ATLAS e CMS at LHC: signal compatible with the Higgs at about 125 GeV:

#### pprox 3 $\sigma$

### 2011: non only Opera...

 April, CDF: absolutely unexpected excess at about 150 GeV

#### $\approx$ 3.2 $\sigma$

September, Opera: neutrinos faster than light


#### pprox 6 $\sigma$

December, ATLAS e CMS at LHC: signal compatible with the Higgs at about 125 GeV:


#### $\approx 3\sigma$

Why there was substancial scepticism towards the first two anouncements, in constrast with a cautious/pronounced optimism towards the third one?

# April 2011 CDF Collaboration at the Tevatron




#### CDF Collaboration at the Tevatron




C) GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 19/78

#### CDF Collaboration at the Tevatron




"we obtain a p-value of  $7.6\times10^{-4},$  corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations"

CDF Collaboration at the Tevatron




"we obtain a p-value of 7.6  $\times$  10<sup>-4</sup>, corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" 3.2  $\sigma$  !

#### CDF Collaboration at the Tevatron




What does it mean?


#### 6.28 km, near Chicago



### $p \rightarrow \cdot \leftarrow \overline{p}$ [ $\approx 1 \, \text{TeV} + 1 \, \text{TeV}$ ]



### CDF: a multipurpose ('hermetic') detector




... a large, very sophisticated detector!



 $\mathsf{Jet}\mathsf{-jet} + \mathsf{W}$ 


 $W + (q\overline{q})$  [+ 'remnants']



© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 21/78

 $\mathsf{Jet}\mathsf{-jet} + \mathsf{W}$ 


W + 2jet [+ much more]



© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 21/78

 $\mathsf{Jet}\mathsf{-jet} + \mathsf{W}$ 


 $\Rightarrow M_{jj} + W + \dots$ 



© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 21/78

# The 'bump'!


Invariant Mass Distribution of Jet Pairs Produced in Association with a W boson in  $p\overline{p}$  Collisions at  $\sqrt{s} = 1.96$  TeV", (CDF, 4 aprile 2011)



"we obtain a p-value of  $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$ , corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" [" $3.2 \sigma$ "]

# The 'bump'!

Invariant Mass Distribution of Jet Pairs Produced in Association with a W boson in  $p\overline{p}$  Collisions at  $\sqrt{s} = 1.96$  TeV", (CDF, 4 aprile 2011)




What does it mean?

### Sigma and gaussian distribution



Sigma and gaussian distribution

"Functio nostra fiet..."



# Sigma e probability [gaussian!]

If the random number X is described by a gaussian pdf

$$P(-\sigma \le X \le +\sigma) = 68.3\%$$

$$P(-2\sigma \le X \le +2\sigma) = 95.4\%$$

$$P(-3\sigma \le X \le +3\sigma) = 99.73\%$$

$$1 - P(-3\sigma \le X \le +3\sigma) = 0.27\%$$

$$1 - P(-4\sigma \le X \le +4\sigma) = 6.3 \times 10^{-5}$$

$$\dots = \dots$$

$$1 - P(-6\sigma \le X \le +6\sigma) = 2.0 \times 10^{-9}$$

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 1 - P(-3.2\,\sigma \leq X \leq +3.2\,\sigma) &=& 1.4 \times 10^{-3} \\ P(X \geq +3.17\,\sigma) &=& 7.6 \times 10^{-4} \ \checkmark \end{array}$$

p-value, significance and sigma

# "we obtain a p-value of $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$ , corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" ["3.2 $\sigma$ "]

### p-value, significance and sigma

"we obtain a p-value of  $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$ , corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" [" $3.2 \sigma$ "]





p-value, significance and sigma

"we obtain a p-value of  $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$ , corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" [" $3.2 \sigma$ "]

Begin to fasten seat belts!



- What is a p-value?
- In so far does it provides us a 'significance'?

p-value, significance and sigma

"we obtain a p-value of  $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$ , corresponding to a significance of 3.2 standard deviations" [" $3.2 \sigma$ "]



- What is a p-value?
- In so far does it provides us a 'significance'?

In short,

• <u>Is</u> 7.6  $\times$  10<sup>-4</sup> a probability?

of what?

The New York Times, Tuesday, April 5:

"Physicists at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory are planning to announce Wednesday that they have found a suspicious bump in their data that could be evidence of a new elementary particle or even, some say, a new force of nature.

. . .

The experimenters estimate that there is a less than a quarter of 1 percent chance their bump is a statistical fluctuation"

. . .

The New York Times, Tuesday, April 5:

"Physicists at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory are planning to announce Wednesday that they have found a suspicious bump in their data that could be evidence of a new elementary particle or even, some say, a new force of nature.

The experimenters estimate that there is a less than a quarter of 1 percent chance their bump is a statistical fluctuation"

 $P(\text{Statistical fluctuation}) \leq 0.25\%!$ 

. . .

The New York Times, Tuesday, April 5:

"Physicists at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory are planning to announce Wednesday that they have found a suspicious bump in their data that could be evidence of a new elementary particle or even, some say, a new force of nature.

The experimenters estimate that there is a less than a quarter of 1 percent chance their bump is a statistical fluctuation"

 $P(\text{Statistical fluctuation}) \le 0.25\%!$  $P(\text{True Signal}) \ge 99.75\%!!$ 

The New York Times, Tuesday, April 5:

"Physicists at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory are planning to announce Wednesday that they have found a suspicious bump in their data that could be evidence of a new elementary particle or even, some say, a new force of nature.

. . .

The experimenters estimate that there is a less than a quarter of 1 percent chance their bump is a statistical fluctuation"

 $P(\text{Statistical fluctuation}) \le 0.25\%!$  $P(\text{True Signal}) \ge 99.75\%!!$ 

Eureka!!

#### The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"



#### The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"

[Do not ask me how  $7.6 \times 10^{-4}$  becomes  $< 2.5 \times 10^{-3}$  (but this can be considere a minor detail...)]

#### The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"

Much more important the unusual fact that an ArXiV appeared one day was commented by NYT the day after!



#### The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"

Much more important the unusual fact that an ArXiV appeared one day was commented by NYT the day after!

Who believed it was - at 99.75%! - a discover?

- the journalist who reported the news?
- the CDF contactperson and/or the Fermilab PR's who contacted him?

The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"

Much more important the unusual fact that an ArXiV appeared one day was commented by NYT the day after!

Who believed it was - at 99.75%! - a discover?

- the journalist who reported the news?
- the CDF contactperson and/or the Fermilab PR's who contacted him?

From my experience, journalists might make imprecisions, bad they do not invent pieces of news [... at least scientific ones...:-) ]

The New York Times, Tuesday April 5:

"the most significant in physics in half a century"

Much more important the unusual fact that an ArXiV appeared one day was commented by NYT the day after!

In other terms, we do not organize an official seminar in the physics department everytime a student 'discovers' a new effect in the lab!

Fermilab Today, April 7:

"Wednesday afternoon, the CDF collaboration announced that it has evidence of a peak in a specific sample of its data. The peak is an excess of particle collision events that produce a W boson accompanied by two hadronic jets. This peak showed up in a mass region where we did not expect one.

GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 28/78

Fermilab Today, April 7:

"Wednesday afternoon, the CDF collaboration announced that it has evidence of a peak in a specific sample of its data. The peak is an excess of particle collision events that produce a W boson accompanied by two hadronic jets. This peak showed up in a mass region where we did not expect one.

. . .

The significance of this excess was determined to be 3.2 sigma, after accounting for the effect of systematic uncertainties. This means that there is less than a 1 in 1375 chance that the effect is mimicked by a statistical fluctuation."

Fermilab Today, April 7:

. . .

"Wednesday afternoon, the CDF collaboration announced that it has evidence of a peak in a specific sample of its data. The peak is an excess of particle collision events that produce a W boson accompanied by two hadronic jets. This peak showed up in a mass region where we did not expect one.

The significance of this excess was determined to be 3.2 sigma, after accounting for the effect of systematic uncertainties. This means that there is less than a 1 in 1375 chance that the effect is mimicked by a statistical fluctuation."

 $1/1375 = 7.3 \times 10^{-4} \implies P(\text{No stat. fluct.}) = 99.93\%$ 

Discovery News, April 7:

This is a big week for particle physicists, and even they will be having many sleepless nights over the coming months trying to grasp what it all means. That's what happens when physicists come forward, with observational evidence, of what they believe represents something we've never seen before. Even bigger than that: something we never even expected to see.

Discovery News, April 7:

This is a big week for particle physicists, and even they will be having many sleepless nights over the coming months trying to grasp what it all means. That's what happens when physicists come forward, with observational evidence, of what they believe represents something we've never seen before. Even bigger than that: something we never even expected to see.

It is what is known as a "three-sigma event," and this refers to the statistical certainty of a given result. In this case, this result has a 99.7 percent chance of being correct (and a 0.3 percent chance of being wrong)."

Discovery News, April 7:

This is a big week for particle physicists, and even they will be having many sleepless nights over the coming months trying to grasp what it all means. That's what happens when physicists come forward, with observational evidence, of what they believe represents something we've never seen before. Even bigger than that: something we never even expected to see.

• •

It is what is known as a "three-sigma event," and this refers to the statistical certainty of a given result. In this case, this result has a 99.7 percent chance of being correct (and a 0.3 percent chance of being wrong)."

It seems we are understanding well, besides the fact of how 99.9% becomes 99.7%...

. . .

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

"The last and greatest breakthrough from a fantastic machine, or a false alarm on the frontiers of physics?

If the histograms and data are exactly right, the paper quotes a one-in-ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke."

. . .

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

"The last and greatest breakthrough from a fantastic machine, or a false alarm on the frontiers of physics?

If the histograms and data are exactly right, the paper quotes a one-in-ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke."

 $\Rightarrow$  P(Not Fluke) = P("Genuine") = 99.99%

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

"The last and greatest breakthrough from a fantastic machine, or a false alarm on the frontiers of physics?

If the histograms and data are exactly right, the paper quotes a one-in-ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke."

 $\Rightarrow$  P(Not Fluke) = P("Genuine") = 99.99%

But, at the end of the post:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."
- 2. "... but I would be very happy to lose it."
- 3. "And I reserve the right to change my mind rapidly as more data come in!"

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

"The last and greatest breakthrough from a fantastic machine, or a false alarm on the frontiers of physics?

If the histograms and data are exactly right, the paper quotes a one-in-ten-thousand (0.0001) chance that this bump is a fluke."

 $\Rightarrow$  P(Not Fluke) = P("Genuine") = 99.99%

But, at the end of the post:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."
- 2. "... but I would be very happy to lose it."
- 3. "And I reserve the right to change my mind rapidly as more data come in!"

Assolutetly meaningful! (A part from the initial mismatch)

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."
  - "I don't believe it!"



Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,  $\ldots$  "
  - "I don't believe it!"
- 2. "... but I would be very happy to lose it."
  - "What I wish"  $\neq$  "What I believe"

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."
  - "I don't believe it!"
- 2. "... but I would be very happy to lose it."

"What I wish"  $\neq$  "What I believe"

3. "And I reserve the right to change my mind rapidly as more data come in!"

"Learning from the experience!"

 $\Rightarrow$  A physicist should never be dogmatic

Jon Butterworth's blob on the Guardian, April 9:

- 1. "My money is on the false alarm at the moment,..."
  - "I don't believe it!"
- 2. "... but I would be very happy to lose it."

"What I wish"  $\neq$  "What I believe"

3. "And I reserve the right to change my mind rapidly as more data come in!"

"Learning from the experience!"

 $\Rightarrow$  A physicist should never be dogmatic

But how <u>must</u> our convictions <u>rationally</u> change on the light of new experimental data? Is there a logical rule? 'Significant', but not believable!...

Jon Butterworth was not the only one to disbelieve the result. Indeed, the largest majority of physicists disbelieve it.



Jon Butterworth was not the only one to disbelieve the result. Indeed, the largest majority of physicists disbelieve it.  $\Rightarrow$  More or less like in the better known case of Opera's neutrinos faster than light...( $6\sigma$ !) Jon Butterworth was not the only one to disbelieve the result. Indeed, the largest majority of physicists disbelieve it.  $\Rightarrow$  More or less like in the better known case of Opera's neutrinos faster than light...( $6\sigma$ !)

But, then, what the hell do "significances" mean?

#### 'Significant', but not believable!...

Jon Butterworth was not the only one to disbelieve the result. Indeed, the largest majority of physicists disbelieve it.

⇒ More or less like in the better known case of Opera's neutrinos faster than light... $(6\sigma!)$ 

But, then, what the hell do "significances" mean?

"de Rujula's paradox":

"If you disbelieve every result presented as having a 3 sigma – or "equivalently" a 99.7% chance – of being correct. . . You will turn out to be right 99.7% of the times."

(Alvaro de Rujula, private communication)

#### The cemetery of Physics



Alvaro de Rujula

- Basic Idea:
  - ▶ let's start from a 'conventional' model [Standard Modell, rather 'extablished theory', etc:]
     → "H<sub>0</sub>" ("null hypothesis")



- Basic Idea:
  - ▶ let's start from a 'conventional' model [Standard Modell, rather 'extablished theory', etc:]
     → "H<sub>0</sub>" ("null hypothesis")
  - $\Rightarrow$  search for violations of  $H_0$

#### Basic Idea:

 let's start from a 'conventional' model [Standard Modell, rather 'extablished theory', etc:]

 $\rightarrow$  "H<sub>0</sub>" ("null hypothesis")

 $\Rightarrow$  search for violations of  $H_0$ 

Ideally

 $\rightarrow$  'falsify'  $H_0$ 

Basic Idea:

- let's start from a 'conventional' model [Standard Modell, rather 'extablished theory', etc:]
  - $\rightarrow$  "*H*<sub>0</sub>" ("null hypothesis")
- $\Rightarrow$  search for violations of  $H_0$
- Ideally
  - ightarrow 'falsify'  $H_0$
- In practice:
  - $\rightarrow$  does it make sense?
  - $\rightarrow$  how is it done?

#### Testing one hypothesis

- Basic Idea:
  - let's start from a 'conventional' model [Standard Modell, rather 'extablished theory', etc:]
    - $\rightarrow$  "H<sub>0</sub>" ("null hypothesis")
  - $\Rightarrow$  search for violations of  $H_0$
- Ideally
  - $\rightarrow$  'falsify'  $H_0$
- In practice:
  - $\rightarrow$  does it make sense?
  - $\rightarrow$  how is it done?

Let's review the practice and what is behind it  $\Rightarrow$ 

Usually referred to Popper and still considered by many as the *key of scientific progress*.

#### Falsificationism

Usually referred to Popper and still considered by many as the *key of scientific progress*.

if 
$$C_i \rightarrow E_0$$
, then  $E_0^{(mis)} \rightarrow C_i$ 

 $\Rightarrow\,$  Causes that cannot produce the observed effects are ruled out ('falsified').

#### Falsificationism

Usually referred to Popper and still considered by many as the *key of scientific progress*.

if 
$$C_i \rightarrow E_0$$
, then  $E_0^{(mis)} \rightarrow C_i$ 

 $\Rightarrow\,$  Causes that cannot produce the observed effects are ruled out ('falsified').

It seems OK - 'obvious'! - but it is indeed naïve for several aspects.

Proof by contradiction ... 'extended'...

Falsification rule: to what is 'inspired'?



Falsification rule: to what is 'inspired'?

Proof by contradiction of classical, deductive logic:

- Assume that a hypothesis is true;
- Derive 'all' logical consequence;
- If (at least) one of the consequences is known to be false, then the hypothesis is rejected.

Proof by contradiction ... 'extended'...

Falsification rule: to what is 'inspired'?

Proof by contradiction of classical, deductive logic:

- Assume that a hypothesis is true;
- Derive 'all' logical consequence;
- If (at least) one of the consequences is known to be false, then the hypothesis is rejected.

Popperian falsificationism

extends the reasoning to experimental sciences

Proof by contradiction ... 'extended'...

Falsification rule: to what is 'inspired'?

Proof by contradiction of classical, deductive logic:

- Assume that a hypothesis is true;
- Derive 'all' logical consequence;
- If (at least) one of the consequences is known to be false, then the hypothesis is rejected.

Popperian falsificationism

extends the reasoning to experimental sciences

is this extension legitimate?

What shall we do of all hypotheses not yet falsified? (Limbus? How should we progress?)

- What shall we do of all hypotheses not yet falsified? (Limbus? How should we progress?)
- What to do if nothing of what can be observed is incompatible with the hypothesis (or with many hypotheses)?

- What shall we do of all hypotheses not yet falsified? (Limbus? How should we progress?)
- What to do if nothing of what can be observed is incompatible with the hypothesis (or with many hypotheses)?
  - E.g.  $H_i$  being a Gaussian  $f(x | \mu_i, \sigma_i)$ 
    - ⇒ Given any pair or parameters { $\mu_i, \sigma_i$ } (i.e.  $\forall H_i$ ), <u>all</u> values of x from  $-\infty$  to  $+\infty$  are possible.

- What shall we do of all hypotheses not yet falsified? (Limbus? How should we progress?)
- What to do if nothing of what can be observed is incompatible with the hypothesis (or with many hypotheses)?
  - E.g.  $H_i$  being a Gaussian  $f(x \mid \mu_i, \sigma_i)$ 
    - ⇒ Given any pair or parameters { $\mu_i, \sigma_i$ } (i.e.  $\forall H_i$ ), all values of x from  $-\infty$  to  $+\infty$  are possible.
    - ⇒ Having observed any value of  $x_i$  none of  $H_i$  can be, strictly speaking, <u>falsified</u>.



Obviously, this does not means that falsificationism never works,

© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 38/78

Obviously, this does not means that falsificationism never works, as long as no stochastic processes are involved (randomness inherent to the physical processes, or due to 'errors' in measurement).

Obviously, this does not means that falsificationism never works, as long as no stochastic processes are involved (randomness inherent to the physical processes, or due to 'errors' in measurement).

 $\Rightarrow$  Practically never in the experimental sciences!

Obviously, this does not means that falsificationism never works, as long as no stochastic processes are involved (randomness inherent to the physical processes, or due to 'errors' in measurement). Certainly it works against itself:

Science proceeds, in practice, rather differently:

The natural development of Science shows that researches are carried along the directions that seem more <u>credibile</u> (and hopefully fruitful) at a given moment. A behaviour "179 degrees or so out of phase from Popper's idea that we make progress by falsificating theories" (Wilczek, http://arxiv.org/abs/phusics/0403115) Obviously, this does not means that falsificationism never works, as long as no stochastic processes are involved (randomness inherent to the physical processes, or due to 'errors' in measurement). Certainly it works against itself:

⇒ logically speaking, falsificationism has to be considered ... falsified!

... then, statisticians have invented the "hypothesis tests"



... then, statisticians have invented the "hypothesis tests", in which the impossible is replaced by the improbable!

... then, statisticians have invented the "hypothesis tests", in which the impossible is replaced by the improbable! But from the impossible to the improbable there is not just a guestion of guantity, but a guestion of guality.

... then, statisticians have invented the "hypothesis tests", in which the impossible is replaced by the improbable!

But from the impossible to the improbable there is not just a question of quantity, <u>but</u> a question of quality.

This mechanism, logically flawed, is particularly dangerous because is deeply rooted in most scientists, due to education and custom, although not supported by logic.

 $\Rightarrow$  Basically responsible of all fake claims of discoveries in the past decades.

[I am particularly worried about claims concerning our health, or the status of the planet, of which I have no control of the experimental data.]

## A) **if** $C_i \rightarrow E$ , and **we observe** $E \Rightarrow C_i$ is impossible ('false')

A) **if** 
$$C_i \rightarrow E$$
, and **we observe**  $E$   
 $\Rightarrow C_i$  is impossible ('false')


B) **if** 
$$C_i \xrightarrow[\text{small probability}]{} E$$
, and **we observe**  $E$ 

$$\Rightarrow C_i$$
 has small probability to be true  
"most likely false"

© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 40/78

A) **if** 
$$C_i \rightarrow E$$
, and **we observe**  $E$  OK  
 $\Rightarrow C_i$  is impossible ('false')

B) **if** 
$$C_i \xrightarrow[\text{small probability}]{} E$$
, and **we observe**  $E$ 




# But it is behind the rational behind the statistical hypothesis tests


An Italian citizen is chosen <u>at random</u> and sent to take an AIDS test (test is not perfect, as it is the case in practice). *Simplified model*:

 $\begin{array}{rcl} P(\mathsf{Pos} \mid \mathsf{HIV}) &=& 100\% \\ P(\mathsf{Pos} \mid \overline{\mathsf{HIV}}) &=& 0.2\% \\ P(\mathsf{Neg} \mid \overline{\mathsf{HIV}}) &=& 99.8\% \\ \end{array}$   $H_1 = '\mathsf{HIV'} \ (\mathsf{Infected}) & E_1 = \mathsf{Positive} \\ H_2 = '\overline{\mathsf{HIV'}} \ (\mathsf{Not infected}) & E_2 = \mathsf{Negative} \end{array}$ 

An Italian citizen is chosen <u>at random</u> and sent to take an AIDS test (test is not perfect, as it is the case in practice). *Simplified model*:




An Italian citizen is chosen <u>at random</u> and sent to take an AIDS test (test is not perfect, as it is the case in practice). *Simplified model*:



Result:  $\Rightarrow$  <u>Positive</u>

An Italian citizen is chosen <u>at random</u> and sent to take an AIDS test (test is not perfect, as it is the case in practice). *Simplified model*:



Result:  $\Rightarrow$  <u>Positive</u> HIV or not HIV? Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

"It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"?

Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

- "It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"
- "There is only 0.2% probability that the person has no HIV" ?

Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

- "It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"
- "There is only 0.2% probability that the person has no HIV"
- "We are 99.8% confident that the person is infected"?

Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

- "It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"
- "There is only 0.2% probability that the person has no HIV"
- "We are 99.8% confident that the person is infected"
- ▶ "Hypothesis *H*<sub>1</sub>=Healthy is ruled out with 99.8% C.L."

?

?

Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

- "It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"
- "There is only 0.2% probability that the person has no HIV"
- "We are 99.8% confident that the person is infected"
- "Hypothesis  $H_1$ =Healthy is ruled out with 99.8% C.L."

#### NO

Instead,  $P(\text{HIV} | \text{Pos}, \text{ randomly chosen Italian}) \approx 45\%$ Think about it (a crucial information is missing!)

Being  $P(Pos | \overline{HIV}) = 0.2\%$  and having observed 'Positive', can we say

- "It is practically impossible that the person is healthy, since it was practically impossible that an healthy person would result positive"
- "There is only 0.2% probability that the person has no HIV"
- "We are 99.8% confident that the person is infected"
- "Hypothesis  $H_1$ =Healthy is ruled out with 99.8% C.L." ? NO

Instead,  $P(\text{HIV} | \text{Pos, randomly chosen Italian}) \approx 45\%$  $\Rightarrow$  Serious mistake! (not just 99.8% instead of 98.3%)

### $P(A \mid B) \leftrightarrow P(B \mid A)$


#### Pay attention no to arbitrary revert conditional probabilities:

#### In general $P(A | B) \neq P(B | A)$

Pay attention no to arbitrary revert conditional probabilities:

### In general $P(A | B) \neq P(B | A)$

•  $P(\text{Positive} | \overline{HIV}) \neq P(\overline{HIV} | \text{Positive})$ 



Pay attention no to arbitrary revert conditional probabilities:

In general  $P(A | B) \neq P(B | A)$ 

- $P(\text{Positive} | \overline{HIV}) \neq P(\overline{HIV} | \text{Positive})$
- ►  $P(Win | Play) \neq P(Play | Win)$  [Lotto]

Pay attention no to arbitrary revert conditional probabilities: In general  $P(A | B) \neq P(B | A)$ 

- $P(\text{Positive} | \overline{HIV}) \neq P(\overline{HIV} | \text{Positive})$
- $P(Win | Play) \neq P(Play | Win)$  [Lotto]
- $P(Pregnant | Woman) \neq P(Woman | Pregnant)$

# $P(A \mid B) \leftrightarrow P(B \mid A)$

Pay attention no to arbitrary revert conditional probabilities:

In general  $P(A | B) \neq P(B | A)$ 

- $P(\text{Positive} | \overline{HIV}) \neq P(\overline{HIV} | \text{Positive})$
- $P(Win | Play) \neq P(Play | Win)$  [Lotto]
- $P(Pregnant | Woman) \neq P(Woman | Pregnant)$

#### In particular

► A cause might produce a given effect with very low probability, and nevertheless could be the most probable cause of that effect, often the only one!

'Low probability' events

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%,  $\dots$  (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

For example, imagine a Gaussian random generator ( $H_0$ , with  $\mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ ) gives us X = 3.1416.



#### 'Low probability' events

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

For example, imagine a Gaussian random generator ( $H_0$ , with  $\mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ ) gives us X = 3.1416.

 $\rightarrow\,$  What was the probability to give exactly that number?:

$$P(X = 3.1416 | H_0) = \int_{3.14165}^{3.14165} f_{\mathcal{G}}(x | \mu, \sigma) dx$$
  

$$\approx f_{\mathcal{G}}(3.1416 | \mu, \sigma) \times \Delta x$$
  

$$\approx f_{\mathcal{G}}(3.1416 | \mu, \sigma) \times 0.0001$$
  

$$\approx 39 \times 10^{-6}$$

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

For example, imagine a Gaussian random generator ( $H_0$ , with  $\mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ ) gives us X = 3.1416.

 $\rightarrow$  What <u>is</u> the probability that X comes from  $H_0$ ?

### 'Low probability' events

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

For example, imagine a Gaussian random generator ( $H_0$ , with  $\mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ ) gives us X = 3.1416.

- $\rightarrow$  What <u>is</u> the probability that X comes from  $H_0$ ?
  - Certainly NOT  $\approx 39 \times 10^{-6}$ ;

#### 'Low probability' events

Tipical values of statistical practice to reject a hypothesis are 5%, 1%, ... (see 'AIDS test')

BUT the greatest majority of the events of interest have very low probability (before occurring!).

For example, imagine a Gaussian random generator ( $H_0$ , with  $\mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ ) gives us X = 3.1416.

 $\rightarrow$  What <u>is</u> the probability that X comes from  $H_0$ ?

- Certainly NOT  $\approx 39 \times 10^{-6}$ ;
- Indeed, it is exactly 1, since H<sub>0</sub> is the only cause which can produce that effect:

 $P(X = 3.1416 | H_0) \approx 39 \times 10^{-6}$  $P(H_0 | X = 3.1416) = 1.$ 

How to calculate the probability of the rounded value of an outcome (nd):

```
nd=4; m=3; s=1;
(x=round(rnorm(1,m,s),nd)); dnorm(x,m,s)*10-nd
```

How to calculate the probability of the rounded value of an outcome (nd):

```
nd=4; m=3; s=1;
(x=round(rnorm(1,m,s),nd)); dnorm(x,m,s)*10-nd
```

Repeat the last line to get a feeling.

How to calculate the probability of the rounded value of an outcome (nd):

```
nd=4; m=3; s=1;
(x=round(rnorm(1,m,s),nd)); dnorm(x,m,s)*10-nd
```

- Repeat the last line to get a feeling.
- Maximum value:  $\frac{10^{-nd}}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}$  ( $\rightarrow \approx 4^{-5}$  for nd = 4,  $\sigma = 1$ ).

How to calculate the probability of the rounded value of an outcome (nd):

```
nd=4; m=3; s=1;
(x=round(rnorm(1,m,s),nd)); dnorm(x,m,s)*10-nd
```

- Repeat the last line to get a feeling.
- Maximum value:  $\frac{10^{-nd}}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma}}$  ( $\rightarrow \approx 4^{-5}$  for nd = 4,  $\sigma = 1$ ).

Histogram of probabilities:

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

but, instead of repent, throw everything away and finally start to read Laplace (yes, 'our' Laplace!) <u>'he' makes a new invention</u>:

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

but, instead of repent, throw everything away and finally start to read Laplace (yes, 'our' Laplace!) <u>'he' makes a new invention</u>:

 $\rightarrow$  what matters is not the probability of the X, but rather the probability of X or of any other less probable number (or a number farther than X from the expected value – the story is a bit longer...):

$$P(X \ge 3.1416) = \int_{3.14155}^{+\infty} f_{\mathcal{G}}(x \mid \mu, \sigma) dx \approx 44\%$$

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

but, instead of repent, throw everything away and finally start to read Laplace (yes, 'our' Laplace!) 'he' makes a new invention:

 $\rightarrow$  what matters is not the probability of the X, but rather the probability of X or of any other less probable number (or a number farther than X from the expected value – the story is a bit longer...):

$$P(X \ge 3.1416) [= P(X \ge x_{obs})] \Rightarrow$$
 'p-value'

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

- ⇒ Magically the result 'becomes' rather probable! Why, we, silly, worried about it?
- $\Rightarrow$  The statisticians are happy...


Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...

- ⇒ Magically the result 'becomes' rather probable! Why, we, silly, worried about it?
- ⇒ The statisticians are happy... scientists and general public cheated...

Besides the fact that the reasoning based only on the probability of the event given the cause is logically flawed, the 'technical issue' of low probability events which would lead to reject any hypothesis forces the statistician to rethink the question...


- ⇒ Magically the result 'becomes' rather probable! Why, we, silly, worried about it?
- ⇒ The statisticians are happy... scientists and general public cheated...
- ⇒ From the logical point of view the situation has worsened:
  → our conclusions do not depend on what we have observed,
  but also from rarer events not actually observed!

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?



c) GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 47/78


Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?



 $P(x_m | H_3) > P(x_m | H_1) > P(x_m | H_2) = 0$  (!)


Even if  $P(x_m | H_i) \rightarrow 0$  (it depends on resolution)

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?




In particular, the hypothesis  $H_2$  is (truly) falsified (impossible!), although it yields the largest 'p-value'

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?




In particular, the hypothesis  $H_2$  is (truly) falsified (impossible!), although it yields the largest 'p-value', or 'probability of the tail(s)'

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?




C GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 48/78

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?



⇒ The experimental result is irrelevant!


Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?



 $P(x_m | H_3) = P(x_m | H_4) = P(x_m | H_5) = P(x_m | H_6)$ 

 $\Rightarrow The experimental result is irrelevant!$  $\rightarrow we mantain our opinions about H<sub>i</sub>$ 

Which hypothesis is favored by the experimental observation  $x_m$ ?



 $P(x_m | H_3) = P(x_m | H_4) = P(x_m | H_5) = P(x_m | H_6)$ 

⇒ The experimental result is irrelevant!
 ⇒ ... no matter what the different the p-values are!

'p-value' = 'probability of the tail(s)'

#### Which p-value?... 'p-value' = 'probability of the tail(s)'

Of what?



#### Which p-value?... 'p-value' = 'probability of the tail(s)'

### Of what?

 $\rightarrow$  the test variable (' $\theta$ ') is absolutely arbitrary:

$$\theta = \theta(\mathbf{x})$$

 $\rightarrow f(\theta)$  [p.d.f]

Experiment:  $\rightarrow \theta_{mis} = \theta(\mathbf{x}_{mis})$ 

p-value = 
$$P(\theta \ge \theta_{mis})$$
 ('one tail')


C GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 49/78



Constighted life



© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 49/78



far from exhaustive list,







- far from exhaustive list,
- with arbitrary variants:

# Which p-value?...






- far from exhaustive list,
- with arbitrary variants:
- ⇒ practitioners chose the one that provide the result they like better:
  - ightarrow like if you go around until
  - "someone agrees with you"

# Which p-value?...




- far from exhaustive list,
- with arbitrary variants:
- ⇒ practitioners chose the one that provide the result they like better:
  - $\rightarrow$  like if you go around until "someone agrees with you"
  - personal 'golden rule': "the more exotic is the name of the test, the less I believe the result", because I'm pretty shure that several 'normal' tests have been descarded in the meanwhile...


Or look around, searching for 'significance'




# Or look around, searching for 'significance'



# Or look around, searching for 'significance'



# Or look around, searching for'significance'



# P-hacking ("p-value hacking")

The 'science' of inventing significant results...

# p-hacking, or cheating on a p-value

June 11, 2015 By arthur charpentier

Share

(This article was first published on **Freakonometrics** » **R-english**, and kindly contributed to R-bloggers)

Yesterday evening, I discovered some interesting slides on False-Positives, p-Hacking, Statistical Power, and Evidential Value, via <u>GUCBITSS</u>'s post on Twitter. More precisely, there was this slide on how cheating (because that's basically what it is) to get a 'good' model (by targeting the p-value)


- 1. Stop collecting data once p<.05
- Analyze many measures, but report only those with p<.05.</li>
- Collect and analyze many conditions, but only report those with p<.05.</li>
- Use covariates to get p<.05.</li>
- 5. Exclude participants to get p<.05.
- 6. Transform the data to get p<.05.

http://www.r-bloggers.com/p-hacking-or-cheating-on-a-p-value/

Google for "p-hacking"

# $\chi^2$ ... the mother of all p-values

Theory Vs experiment (bars: expectation uncertainty):



- True value of y: 5, independently of x (a.u.);
- Gaussian instrumental error with  $\sigma = 1$ .

# Probability of the data sample

 $P = 8.22 \times 10^{-33}$  is the probability of the 'configuration' of experimental points:

obtained multiplying the probability of each point (independent measurements):

$$P = \prod_{i} P_{i}$$
  
where  $P_{i} = \int_{y_{m_{i}} - \Delta y/2}^{y_{m_{i}} + \Delta y/2} f(y) dy$ 

 as seen, P<sub>i</sub> depends on the 'resolution' Δy (instrumental 'discretization'):

$$ightarrow$$
 we use  $\Delta y = rac{1}{10} \, \sigma$ 

# 'Distance' Experiment-theory: $\chi^2$

)

The costruction of the  $\chi^2$  is very popular (usually in first lab. courses – 'Fisichetta'):

$$\chi^{2} = \sum_{i} \left( \frac{y_{m_{i}} - y_{th_{i}}}{\sigma_{i}} \right)^{2}$$
$$\rightarrow \sum_{i} \left( \frac{y_{m_{i}} - y_{0}}{\sigma} \right)^{2}$$

$$\chi^{2} \sim \Gamma(\nu/2, 1/2) \qquad [\rightarrow \nu = 20]$$

$$E[\chi^{2}] = \nu \qquad [\rightarrow 20]$$

$$Var[\chi^{2}] = 2\nu \qquad [\rightarrow 40]$$

$$Std[\chi^{2}] = \sqrt{2\nu} \qquad [\rightarrow 6.3]$$

$$Mode[\chi^{2}] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \nu \leq 2\\ \nu - 2 & \text{if } \nu > 2 \end{cases} \qquad [\rightarrow 18]$$


$$\Rightarrow \qquad \chi^{2} = 20 \pm 6$$

Our expectations about  $\chi^2$ 


$$E[\chi^{2}] = \nu \qquad [\rightarrow 20]$$
  

$$Std[\chi^{2}] = \sqrt{2\nu} \qquad [\rightarrow 6.3]$$
  


$$\Rightarrow \qquad \chi^{2} = 20 \pm 6$$
  
[mode: 18]




© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 58/78




In the average. (but someone could see the points forming a 'constellation'...)




Too good?




 $\chi^2 =$  52.6, with a p-value = 0.93  $\times$   $10^{-4}$  At limit?




 $\chi^2 = 52.6$ , with a p-value =  $0.93 \times 10^{-4}$ At limit? Just come out at the first time (9 Oct. 2012, 13:01) while(chi2.ym() < 38) source("chi2\_1.R")



C) GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 59/78




Note:  $\chi^2_{mis}$  52.6 is 5.1 $\sigma$  from its expectation  $\left[\frac{52.6-20}{\sqrt{40}} = 5.1\right]$ , but the p-value is comunicated as "3.7 $\sigma$ ", referring to the probability of the tail above 3.7 $\sigma$  of an 'equivalent Gaussian'.



Note:  $\chi^2_{mis}$  52.6 is 5.1 $\sigma$  from its expectation  $\left[\frac{52.6-20}{\sqrt{40}} = 5.1\right]$ , but the p-value is comunicated as "3.7 $\sigma$ ", referring to the probability of the tail above 3.7 $\sigma$  of an 'equivalent Gaussian'. (as if there were already not enough confusion...)

# The art of $\chi^2$


Sometimes the  $\chi^2$  test does not give "the wished result"



Then it is calculated in the 'suspicious region'

# The art of $\chi^2$

Sometimes the  $\chi^2$  test does not give "the wished result"



Then it is calculated in the 'suspicious region'

- $\Rightarrow \text{ If we add the two side points, } \chi^2$  becomes 22.2.
- $\Rightarrow$  But with 5 points we had got a p-value of 5  $\times$  10<sup>-4</sup>

#### p-value: what they are

p-value:

Probability of the tail(s) of a 'test variable' (a "statistic"):

$$\begin{split} P(\theta \geq \theta_{mis}) &= \int_{\theta_{mis}}^{\infty} f(\theta \mid H_0) \, d\theta \\ P[(\theta \geq \theta_{mis}) \cap (\theta \leq (\theta^c)_{mis})] &= 1 - \int_{(\theta^c)_{mis}}^{\theta_{mis}} f(\theta \mid H_0) \, d\theta \end{split}$$

- $\theta$  is an arbitrary function of the data.
- ...and often of a subsample of the data.
- ► f(θ | H<sub>0</sub>) is obtained 'somehow', analitically, numerically, or by Monte Carlo methods.

#### p-value: what they are

p-value:

Probability of the tail(s) of a 'test variable' (a "statistic"):

$$\begin{split} P(\theta \geq \theta_{mis}) &= \int_{\theta_{mis}}^{\infty} f(\theta \mid H_0) \, d\theta \\ P[(\theta \geq \theta_{mis}) \cap (\theta \leq (\theta^c)_{mis})] &= 1 - \int_{(\theta^c)_{mis}}^{\theta_{mis}} f(\theta \mid H_0) \, d\theta \end{split}$$

- $\theta$  is an arbitrary function of the data.
- ... and often of a subsample of the data.
- ► f(θ | H<sub>0</sub>) is obtained 'somehow', analitically, numerically, or by Monte Carlo methods.

# What they are not $\Rightarrow$

Homework: calculate the average of 300 random numbers, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

Homework: calculate the average of 300 random numbers, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

► Teacher expectation:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{E}\left[\overline{X}_{300}\right] &=& \frac{1}{2} \\ \sigma\left[\overline{X}_{300}\right] &=& \frac{1}{\sqrt{12}} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{300}} = 0.017 \,, \end{split}$$

Homework: calculate the average of 300 random numbers, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

► Teacher expectation:

▶ 99% probability interval

$$P(0.456 \le \overline{X}_{300} \le 0.544) = 99\%$$
 .

Homework: calculate the average of 300 random numbers, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.

Teacher expectation:

99% probability interval

$$P(0.456 \le \overline{X}_{300} \le 0.544) = 99\%$$
.

- Student gets a value outside the interval, e.g.  $\overline{x} = 0.550$ .
- $\Rightarrow$  Has the student made a mistake?


Conventional statistician solution:

 $\Rightarrow$  test the hypothesis  $H_0 =$  'no mistakes'



Conventional statistician solution:

 $\Rightarrow$  test the hypothesis  $H_0 =$  'no mistakes'




• Test variable  $\theta$  is  $\overline{X}_{300}$ .

• Acceptance interval  $[\theta_1, \theta_2]$  is [0.456, 0.544]. We are 99% confident that  $\overline{X}_{300}$  will fall inside it:  $\rightarrow \alpha = 1\%$ .

Conventional statistician solution:

 $\Rightarrow$  test the hypothesis  $H_0 =$  'no mistakes'




• Test variable  $\theta$  is  $\overline{X}_{300}$ .

- Acceptance interval  $[\theta_1, \theta_2]$  is [0.456, 0.544]. We are 99% confident that  $\overline{X}_{300}$  will fall inside it:  $\rightarrow \alpha = 1\%$ .
- $\overline{x} = 0.550$  lies outside the acceptance interval
- $\Rightarrow$  Hypothesis  $H_0$  is rejected at 1% significance.

Conventional statistician solution:

 $\Rightarrow$  test the hypothesis  $H_0 =$  'no mistakes'



• Test variable  $\theta$  is  $\overline{X}_{300}$ .

- Acceptance interval  $[\theta_1, \theta_2]$  is [0.456, 0.544]. We are 99% confident that  $\overline{X}_{300}$  will fall inside it:  $\rightarrow \alpha = 1\%$ .
- $\overline{x} = 0.550$  lies outside the acceptance interval
- $\Rightarrow$  Hypothesis  $H_0$  is rejected at 1% significance.
- $\Rightarrow$  What does it mean?

Conclusion from test:

"the hypothesis  $H_{\circ}$  = 'no mistakes' is rejected at the 1% level of significance".

Conclusion from test:

"the hypothesis  $H_{\circ}$  = 'no mistakes' is rejected at the 1% level of significance".

What does it mean?

"there is only a 1% probability that the average falls outside the selected interval, if the calculations were done correctly".

Conclusion from test:

"the hypothesis  $H_{\circ}$  = 'no mistakes' is rejected at the 1% level of significance".

What does it mean?

"there is only a 1% probability that the average falls outside the selected interval, if the calculations were done correctly". So what?



Conclusion from test:

"the hypothesis  $H_{\circ}$  = 'no mistakes' is rejected at the 1% level of significance".

What does it mean?

"there is only a 1% probability that the average falls outside the selected interval, if the calculations were done correctly".

So what?

- It does not reply our natural question, i.e. that concerning the probability of mistake – quite impolite, by the way.
- The statement sounds as if one would be 99% sure that the student has made a mistake! (Mostly interpreted in this way).
- $\Rightarrow$  Highly misleading!

# Something is missing in the reasoning

If you ask the students (before they take a standard course in hypothesis tests) you will realize of a crucial ingredient extraneous to the logic of hypothesis tests:

# Something is missing in the reasoning

If you ask the students (before they take a standard course in hypothesis tests) you will realize of a crucial ingredient extraneous to the logic of hypothesis tests:

"It all depends on whom has made the calculation!"



#### Something is missing in the reasoning

If you ask the students (before they take a standard course in hypothesis tests) you will realize of a crucial ingredient extraneous to the logic of hypothesis tests:

"It all depends on whom has made the calculation!"

In fact, if the calculation was done by a well-tested program, the probability of mistake would be zero. And students know rather well their tendency to do or not mistakes.

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ .

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

we cannot say

"the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

- "the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"
- "the probability that the observation is a statistical fluctuation is 0.27%"

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

- "the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"
- "the probability that the observation is a statistical fluctuation is 0.27%"
- $\Rightarrow$  the value comes with 100% probability from that generator!

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

- "the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"
- "the probability that the observation is a statistical fluctuation is 0.27%"
- $\Rightarrow$  the value comes with 100% probability from that generator!
- $\Rightarrow\,$  it is at 100% a statistical fluctuation

The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

- "the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"
- "the probability that the observation is a statistical fluctuation is 0.27%"
- $\Rightarrow$  the value comes with 100% probability from that generator!
- $\Rightarrow$  it is at 100% a statistical fluctuation
- Logical bug of the reasoning:
  - $\Rightarrow$  One cannot tell how much one is confident in generator A only if another generator B is not taken into account.


The value x = 3.01 is extracted from a Gaussian random number generator having  $\mu = 0$  and  $\sigma = 1$ . It is well known that P(|X| > 3) = 0.27%, <u>but</u>

- "the value X has 0.27% probability of coming from that generator"
- "the probability that the observation is a statistical fluctuation is 0.27%"
- $\Rightarrow$  the value comes with 100% probability from that generator!
- $\Rightarrow\,$  it is at 100% a statistical fluctuation
- Logical bug of the reasoning:
  - $\Rightarrow$  One cannot tell how much one is confident in generator A only if another generator B is not taken into account.
  - $\Rightarrow$  This is the original sin of conventional hypothesis test methods

Choose among  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  having observed x = 3:

© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 67/78


Choose among  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  having observed x = 3:



The statistics-uneducated student would suggest:

 our preference should depend on how likely each model might yield x = 3


Choose among  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  having observed x = 3:



The statistics-uneducated student would suggest:

- our preference should depend on how likely each model might yield x = 3
- ... but perhaps also on 'how reasonable' each model is, given the physical situation under study

Choose among  $H_1$ ,  $H_2$  and  $H_3$  having observed x = 3:



The statistics-uneducated student would suggest:

- our preference should depend on how likely each model might yield x = 3
- ... but perhaps also on 'how reasonable' each model is, given the physical situation under study
- $\Rightarrow$  Right!

"These are chosen academic examples."

"These are chosen academic examples." ⇒ logic is logic!

"These are chosen academic examples."

 $\Rightarrow \text{ logic is logic!}$ 

How can we use a reasoning in frontier physics if it fails in simple cases?

 $\Rightarrow \text{ All fake claims of discoveries are due to} \\ \text{the criticized reasoning (examples in a while } \longrightarrow )$ 

"These are chosen academic examples."

 $\Rightarrow$  logic is logic!

How can we use a reasoning in frontier physics if it fails in simple cases?

 $\Rightarrow \text{ All fake claims of discoveries are due to} \\ \text{the criticized reasoning (examples in a while } \longrightarrow )$ 

"Hypotheses tests are well proved to work"

"These are chosen academic examples."

 $\Rightarrow \text{ logic is logic!}$ 

How can we use a reasoning in frontier physics if it fails in simple cases?

 $\Rightarrow$  All fake claims of discoveries are due to the criticized reasoning (examples in a while  $\longrightarrow$ )

"Hypotheses tests are well proved to work"

Yes and not...

- $\Rightarrow$  They 'often work' due to reasons external to their logic, but which are not always satisfied, especially in the frontier cases that mostly concern us.
  - $\longrightarrow$  we shall come back to this point

Examples from particle physics

Many, too many, unfortunatly...



I case I lived in first person was that of the (in)famous  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{HERA}}$  events

> see slides at
http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/cernAT05\_scanned/

Examples from particle physics

Many, too many, unfortunatly...



I case I lived in first person was that of the (in)famous  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{HERA}}$  events

⇒ see slides at http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/cernAT05\_scanned/

(And the logical error happens not only in the case of fake discoveries, but also when a highly expected particle is finally found – wait for a while...)

What we wanted:

▶ falsify the hypothesis H<sub>0</sub>:
 ⇒ impossible, from the logical point of view (as long as there are stochastic effects).

What we wanted:

- ▶ falsify the hypothesis H<sub>0</sub>:
   ⇒ impossible, from the logical point of view (as long as there are stochastic effects).
- Therefore we content ourself with
  - updating our confidence about H<sub>0</sub> in the light of the experimental data:

 $P(H_0 \,|\, \text{data})$ 

- What we wanted:
  - ▶ falsify the hypothesis H<sub>0</sub>:
     ⇒ impossible, from the logical point of view (as long as there are stochastic effects).
- Therefore we content ourself with
  - updating our confidence about H<sub>0</sub> in the light of the experimental data:

 $P(H_0 | data)$ 

 $\Rightarrow$  BUT the p-value do not provide this:

$$P(\theta \ge \theta_{mis} \mid H_0) \iff P(H_0 \mid \theta_{mis})$$

 $\Rightarrow$  Although they are erroneously confused with this!

- What we wanted:
  - ► falsify the hypothesis *H*<sub>0</sub>:

 $\Rightarrow$  impossible, from the logical point of view (as long as there are stochastic effects).

- Therefore we content ourself with
  - updating our confidence about H<sub>0</sub> in the light of the experimental data:

 $P(H_0 | data)$ 



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value#Misunderstandings

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value#Misunderstandings

1. The p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is true.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value#Misunderstandings

1. The p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In fact, frequentist statistics does not, and cannot, attach probabilities to hypotheses. ...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value#Misunderstandings

- 1. The p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In fact, frequentist statistics does not, and cannot, attach probabilities to hypotheses. ...
- 2. The p-value is not the probability that a finding is "merely a fluke."...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value#Misunderstandings

- 1. The p-value is not the probability that the null hypothesis is true. In fact, frequentist statistics does not, and cannot, attach probabilities to hypotheses. ...
- 2. The p-value is not the probability that a finding is "merely a fluke."...
- 3. The p-value is not the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis.

```
7. . . .
```

July 2012

- "The data confirm the 5 sigma threshold, i.e. a probability of discovery of 99.99994%" (one of the many claims you could read on the web).
- "I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento" spiega Gian Francesco Giudice, teorico del CERN (corriere.it, 3 luglio)

July 2012

- "The data confirm the 5 sigma threshold, i.e. a probability of discovery of 99.99994%" (one of the many claims you could read on the web).
- "I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento" spiega Gian Francesco Giudice, teorico del CERN (corriere.it, 3 luglio)
- "Ahead of the expected announcement, the journal Nature reported 'pure elation' Monday among physicists searching for the Higgs boson. One team saw only "a 0.00006% chance of being wrong, the journal said." (USA Today, 2 July 2012).

July 2012

- "The data confirm the 5 sigma threshold, i.e. a probability of discovery of 99.99994%" (one of the many claims you could read on the web).
- "I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento" spiega Gian Francesco Giudice, teorico del CERN (corriere.it, 3 luglio)
- "Ahead of the expected announcement, the journal Nature reported 'pure elation' Monday among physicists searching for the Higgs boson. One team saw only "a 0.00006% chance of being wrong, the journal said." (USA Today, 2 July 2012).
- Etc. etc.  $\Rightarrow$  Google (July 2014)
  - "higgs cern 0.00006 chance":  $\approx 1.6 \times 10^4$  results

July 2012

- "The data confirm the 5 sigma threshold, i.e. a probability of discovery of 99.99994%" (one of the many claims you could read on the web).
- "I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento" spiega Gian Francesco Giudice, teorico del CERN (corriere.it, 3 luglio)
- "Ahead of the expected announcement, the journal Nature reported 'pure elation' Monday among physicists searching for the Higgs boson. One team saw only "a 0.00006% chance of being wrong, the journal said." (USA Today, 2 July 2012).
- Etc. etc.  $\Rightarrow$  Google (July 2014)
  - "higgs cern 0.00006 chance":  $\approx 1.6 \times 10^4$  results
  - "higgs cern '99.99994%"':  $\approx 1.5 \times 10^6$  results

http://www.romal.infn.it/~dagos/badmath/#added

# The sigma's and the physics Repubblica.it (25/5/2016)

"Da un laboratorio ungherese spunta la quinta forza fondamentale"

# The sigma's and the physics Repubblica.it (25/5/2016)

- "Da un laboratorio ungherese spunta la quinta forza fondamentale"
- "Siamo sicuri dei nostri risultati" ha confermato a Nature Krasznahorkay. "Abbiamo ripetuto più volte l'esperimento per eliminare tutte le possibili cause d'errore: abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità a una possibilità su 200 miliardi".

# The sigma's and the physics Republica.it (25/5/2016)

- "Da un laboratorio ungherese spunta la quinta forza fondamentale"
- "Siamo sicuri dei nostri risultati" ha confermato a Nature Krasznahorkay. "Abbiamo ripetuto più volte l'esperimento per eliminare tutte le possibili cause d'errore: abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità a una possibilità su 200 miliardi".
- "Se devo scommettere, punto sul fatto che il risultato non reggerà le verifiche. Tuttavia il risultato ungherese merita di essere controllato" dice Gian Giudice, direttore del Dipartimento di fisica teorica del Cern di Ginevra.

#### The sigma's and the physics Republica.it (25/5/2016)

- "Da un laboratorio ungherese spunta la quinta forza fondamentale"
- "Siamo sicuri dei nostri risultati" ha confermato a Nature Krasznahorkay. "Abbiamo ripetuto più volte l'esperimento per eliminare tutte le possibili cause d'errore: abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità a una possibilità su 200 miliardi".
- "Se devo scommettere, punto sul fatto che il risultato non reggerà le verifiche. Tuttavia il risultato ungherese merita di essere controllato" dice Gian Giudice, direttore del Dipartimento di fisica teorica del Cern di Ginevra.

Nel 2012 diceva

"I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento"

#### The sigma's and the physics Republica.it (25/5/2016)

- "Da un laboratorio ungherese spunta la quinta forza fondamentale"
- "Siamo sicuri dei nostri risultati" ha confermato a Nature Krasznahorkay. "Abbiamo ripetuto più volte l'esperimento per eliminare tutte le possibili cause d'errore: abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità a una possibilità su 200 miliardi".
- "Se devo scommettere, punto sul fatto che il risultato non reggerà le verifiche. Tuttavia il risultato ungherese merita di essere controllato" dice Gian Giudice, direttore del Dipartimento di fisica teorica del Cern di Ginevra.

Nel 2012 diceva

"I dati confermano la soglia dei 5 sigma, vale a dire una probabilità di scoperta pari al 99,99994 per cento"

Siamo uomini o caporali?!

"una possibilità su 200 miliardi"

• "una possibilità su 200 miliardi"  $\rightarrow$  p-value = 5 × 10<sup>-12</sup>

► "una possibilità su 200 miliardi" → p-value =  $5 \times 10^{-12} \approx 6.8 \sigma' s$ 

- "una possibilità su 200 miliardi"  $\rightarrow$  p-value = 5 × 10<sup>-12</sup>  $\approx$  6.8  $\sigma$ 's
- "abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità (possibile errore) a una possibilità su 200 miliardi"

- "una possibilità su 200 miliardi"
  - $ightarrow \,$  p-value = 5 imes 10<sup>-12</sup> pprox 6.8  $\sigma's$
- "abbiamo ridotto una simile eventualità (possibile errore) a una possibilità su 200 miliardi"
- BUT The p-value is not the probability that a finding is "merely a fluke."

#### What is the position of statisticians concerning p-values?



What is the position of statisticians concerning p-values?

- The 2016 p-value revolution
  - $\rightarrow$  http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/dott-prob/
  - $\rightarrow$  Nr. 13 (10/3)



What is the position of statisticians concerning p-values?

- The 2016 p-value revolution
  - $\rightarrow$  http://www.roma1.infn.it/~dagos/dott-prob/  $\rightarrow$  Nr. 13 (10/3)

(Many other links there concerning p-values)

Are we then really stuck?



Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ....

When the game becomes probabilistic...
 ... probability theory has to enter the game.

Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ....

When the game becomes probabilistic...
 ... probability theory has to enter the game.
 ??

But there weren't already Gaussians,  $\chi^2$ ,  $\sigma$ 's, etc.?

Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ....

When the game becomes probabilistic...
 ... probability theory has to enter the game.
 ??

But there weren't already Gaussians,  $\chi^2$ ,  $\sigma$ 's, etc.?

The 'classical' framework of hypothesis tests misses – because explicitally forbitten! – the foundamental thing we need in our game:

Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ...

When the game becomes probabilistic...

... probability theory has to enter the game. ??

But there weren't already Gaussians,  $\chi^2$ ,  $\sigma$ 's, etc.?

The 'classical' framework of hypothesis tests misses – because explicitally forbitten! – the foundamental thing we need in our game:

probability of hypotheses.

Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ...

- When the game becomes probabilistic...
  - ... probability theory has to enter the game.

??

But there weren't already Gaussians,  $\chi^2$ ,  $\sigma$ 's, etc.?

The 'classical' framework of hypothesis tests misses – because explicitally forbitten! – the foundamental thing we need in our game:

probability of hypotheses.

- 'Mismatch' between our natural way of thinking and the statistics theory:
- $\blacktriangleright \ P(H_0 \,|\, \mathsf{data}) \longleftrightarrow P(\theta \geq \theta_{\mathit{mis}} \,|\, H_0)$

Are we then really stuck?

Fortunatly not, at some conditions ...

When the game becomes probabilistic... ... probability theory has to enter the game. ??

But there weren't already Gaussians,  $\chi^2$ ,  $\sigma$ 's, etc.?

- The 'classical' framework of hypothesis tests misses because explicitally forbitten! – the foundamental thing we need in our game:
- It is enough get rid of '900 statisticians (the 'frequentists') and reload 'serious guys',
  - $\rightarrow$  restart from Laplace, together with Gauss, Bayes, etc.,

Restarting from scratch

# We need to restart from scratch

(from a physicist's perspective)

C GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 77/78

#### The End

### FINE Parte 1

© GdA, Otranto, 5/06/16 [1] - 78/78